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TREATMENT OF MONETARY FRINGE BENEFITS AND
POST TERMINATION SURVIVAL OF THE RIGHT
TO JOB SECURITY*
PERHAPS prompted by a misdirected quest for security, most collective bar-
gaining agreements provide for two basic categories of benefits that are based
on seniority status: monetary fringe benefits, including the right to vacation,
severance, and pension pay, and job security benefits, which primarily concern
the right to be laid off in reverse order of seniority and recalled in direct order
of seniority within a specified department, job classification, or plant.1 To re-
ceive either of these benefits, an employee must achieve seniority status based
upon a specific length of service time and frequently must render continuous
service for a minimum "qualification" period.2 Collective agreements almost in-
variably contain an expiration or termination clause, providing that the agree-
ment shall expire after two or three years duration. Such agreements, however,
do not spell out the effect of termination or expiration of the collective contract
on either job security or monetary fringe benefits that are not claimed until
shortly before or after termination. In most cases the agreement between the
union and the employer is renegotiated and the monetary fringe benefit and
job security provisions are incorporated in the new agreement. But where no
new agreement is forthcoming, because the employer ceases operations or
moves his plant to a new location, the troublesome question arises whether an
employee's right to vacation or severance pay or to preferential layoff or recall
survive the expiration of the collective agreement or termination of the em-
ployment relationship. In the case of claims to vacation, severance, or pension
pay, courts have resolved this issue through a unique use of concepts borrowed
from hornbook contract law. Although the rationale behind the application of
such concepts as reliance, substantial performance, and unjust enrichment is
not fully developed or at least articulated in these decisions, the results reached
through their use have generally been considered fair and just among those
familiar with the intricacies of collective bargaining. They thus seem relevant
to the largely unsettled question of whether the right to preferential layoff and
recall extends beyond the duration of the collective contract.
*An earlier version of this Comment was submitted in satisfaction of the Divisional
writing requirement of the Yale Law School, Labor Law Division, 1961-1962. The Jourtnal
expresses its appreciation to Professors Clyde W. Summers and Harry H. Wellington for
bringing this paper to the attention of the Editors.
1. See Mitchem, Seniority Clauses it; Collective Bargaining Agreemnents, 21 RocKsY
MIT. L. REv. 156 (1949).
Some agreements provide that the length of the period during which employees will be
recalled on the basis of seniority is the same for all employees-either a fixed period or
one of indefinite duration.; others vary the length of the recall period on the basis of an
employee's accumulated seniority.
2. Variations of this model appear in Vacation Provisions, 46 L.R.R.M. 26-29 (1961).
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Treatment of vacation, severance, and pension pay after ternination
Vacation provisions frequently provide for a vacation with pay to employees
who fulfill three particular requirements. They prescribe that the employee
obtain seniority status by working for a minimum period of time, usually two
years, that he work a specified minimum number of hours during the vacation
year, and that he be employed on the stated "qualification" date.3 The most
commonly litigated claim to vacation pay arises where the contract is termi-
nated before the qualification date for vacations is reached, but after the claim-
ants have fulfilled the contractual seniority and service requirements 4 In such
cases employees who have met the seniority and service requirements are con-
sistently held to have earned the right to vacation pay, notwithstanding that
the scheduled vacation period is not to occur until after the termination date.5
The rationale of these decisions is that vacation pay, like wages, is earned
through continuous employee service prior to the expiration of the agreement. 0
In respect to termination clauses, courts generally state that:
[W]hile collective bargaining contracts are normally made for fixed
periods of time, they generally contemplate renewals and a subsisting con-
tractual relationship between the employer and the union of indefinite dura-
tion. It will therefore be commonplace that rights to which employees are
entitled under a collective bargaining agreement may not actually fructify
in enjoyment until after the expiration of a given contract period with
reference to which they may be regarded as having been earned.7
Where the qualification date is imminent, courts allow recovery on the theory
that the employee has substantially performed the obligations of the agreement
and thus is entitled to full compensation for his services.8 Where a substantial
part of the vacation year remains before the qualification date, courts never-
theless permit recovery of a pro rata share of the contractual amount on the
ground that a proportion of the total is earned daily. Thus where an employer,
3. Ibid.
4. See, e.g., Livestock Feeds v. Local 1634, CIO, 34 L.R.R.M. 2433 (Miss. 1954);
Textile Workers v. Paris Fabric Mills, 22 N.J. Super. 381, 92 A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1952).
5. See note 4 supra and Kidde Mfg. Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 27 N.J. Super. 183,
99 A-2d 210 (1953); Ross v. Crescent School of Radio & Television, Inc., 32 L.R.M.
2749 (N.Y. City Ct. 1953).
6. As stated in In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1940), where
employees were claiming a priority against the bankrupt for "wages," including vacation
pay:
A vacation with pay is in effect additional wages. It involves a reasonable arrange-
ment to secure the well being of employees and the continuance of harmonious
relations between employer and employee. The consideration for the contract to pay
for a week's vacation had been furnished, that is to say, one year's service had been
rendered prior to June 1, so that the week's vacation with pay was completely earned
and only the time of receiving it was postponed.
7. Botany Mills Inc. v. Textile Workers, 50 N.J. Super. 18, 29, 141 A2d 107, 113
(App. Div. 1958).
8. Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Ryan Aeronautical Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d
833, 236 P2d 236 (App. Dep't 1951).
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in shutting down his entire plant, exercised his option to terminate 3 months
prior to the qualification date, employees were able to recover three-fourths of
their vacation salary.9
Provisions for severance pay frequently gear the amount of such benefits to
the length of the employee's service,10 and in this respect are similar to the
seniority requirement for vacation benefits. But unlike vacation pay, severance
pay is not conditioned upon employment on a stipulated qualification date or
minimum hours of service during the year of severance. In contesting claims
to severance pay after expiration or nonrenewal of the collective contract, em-
ployers have argued that the termination provision operates as a contractual
time limitation on liability for severance pay. In rejecting this view, most
courts and arbitrators, again applying the wage analogy, have held that the
right to severance pay is earned through the rendering of services for the specific
seniority period, and therefore survives the expiration of the collective agree-
ment.-" Since such provisions "procure efficient and faithful service and con-
9. Livestock Feeds v. Local 1634, CIO, 34 L.R.R.M. 2433 (Miss. 1954). Cf. Copeo
Steel Co. v. Local 1240, UAW, 44 L.R.R.M. 2174 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1959). But cl. cases
where neither the qualification date nor the termination date is reached at the time of lay-
off: Treloar v. Steggeman, 333 Mich. 166, 52 N.W.2d 647 (1952) ; Wanhope v. Press Co.,
281 N.Y. 607, 22 N.E.2d 171 (1939). In, these circumstances arbitrators have been uniform-
ly liberal in rejecting the "condition precedent" approach, treating vacation pay as wages
accrued daily. See, e.g., Monument Mills, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 400 (1957) ; A. D. Juilllard
& Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 896 (1952). Where an employee has qualified under a previous con-
tract, even a resignation in violation of the notice provisions of that contract will not forfeit
the vacation pay; Badger Concrete, Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 912 (1961).
A number of federal courts have held that vacation claims were the equivalent of wages
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g., United States v. Munro-Varn Helms Co.,
39 L.R.R.M. 2598 (5th Cir. 1957) ; In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.
1940). But cf. United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959), reversing
254 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1958), where the Supreme Court, dealing with a welfare plan, held
that such a benefit was not wages even though within, the "wage package" at the bargaih-
ing table.
10. See, e.g., the provision in Adams v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 37 L.R.R.M.
2691, 2692 (N.J. 1956).
Regular Employees who have completed one (1) year or more of continuous service
and who are permanently released from employment because of reasons beyond the
control of the employees concerned, shall be given, an allowance of one (1) week's
base pay at the rate of pay at the time of release for each full year of continuous
service.
See also provisions in Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956) ;
Ackerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Minn. 271, 48 N.W.2d 338 (1951).
11. Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A,2d 442 (1956); Hercules
Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949). In Owens v. Press Publish-
ing Co., .mpra at 548, 120 A.2d at 448, the court limited the computation of the severance
payment to the term of the agreement, stating that
Of course, the right to such pay can "arise" only during the subsistence of the
contract so providing, and not after its termination; but once the right thus comes
into being it will survive the termination of the agreement.
In Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, supra at 543, 53 S.E2d at 809, the company had
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tinuous employment," termination or discontinuance cannot operate to deprive
employees "of benefits of dismissal salary already earned"; such action would
constitute a "forfeiture of plaintiff's rights amounting to a breach of contract."-
Where the employment relationship is terminated by the employee's death,
resignation, or discharge for cause, however, the employer is not liable for
severance pay.'
3
Retirement benefits are based upon specified age and service requirements ;14
litigation over pension plans has arisen where plant removal, contraction, or
shutdown terminates the employment relationship before employees have ob-
tained sufficient service time or reached retirement age."; Despite considerable
reserved an explicit right to terminate the plan, and claimed that such termination prior
to actual separation from employment nullified the rights. The court responded that
[T]he right of discontinuance of the plan as to any unearned benefits was reserved
by defendant. Yet, it could not be discontinued and thus deprive the plaintiff of bene-
fits of dismissal salary already earned as of the date of its discontinuance. That would
constitute not mere discontinuance of the plan, but forfeiture of plaintiff's contractual
rights amounting to a breach of the contract.
Rights to severance pay have been held to survive even where the employment is terminated
by means other than expiration of the agreement: Adams v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light
Co., 37 L.RRM. 2691 (N.J. 1956) (S.E.C. order requiring the utility to sell its business) ;
In re Elliott Grocery Co., 28 L.R.R.M. 2414 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (priority granted under
Bankruptcy laws); Ackerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Mina. 271, 48 N.W2d 333
(1951) (layoff due to mechanization); Montefalcone v. Banco Di Napoli Trust Co., 263
App. Div. 636, 52 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1945) (wartime liquidation by the Superintendent of
Banks).
The notion that severance benefits are earned rights is well expressed by Willard Wirtz
in a recent arbitration, opinion:
The services the employee performed during the cumulative six month periods were
his part of the bargain. The Publisher's reciprocal commitment was to make the
stipulated payments in the event of dismissal The employee claimants in the present
case had fulfilled completely their part of this bargain. To hold that the termination
of the contract period terminated the Publisher's obligation to make this agreed
upon deferred payment for services already rendered would be to deny a payment
which had been fully earned, and to let one party escape liability where the other
party had fully performed his reciprocal obligation.
In re Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 156, 160 (1959).
12. Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949).
13. Such conditions are usually specifically enumerated in the provision. See, e.g., pro-
visions cited in note 10 supra.
14. "The spread of negotiated pension and social insurance plans continues at a steady
pace, according to BNA's study of mid-1960 contracts.. ." Basic Patterns in Union Con-
tracts, 47 L.R.R.M. 28, 40 (1961).
15. In cases of sale, Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 42 L.R.R.M. 2643 (Minn.
1958) ; shutdown of a division, Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d
Cir. 1958) ; and transferral of a strategic business to the Government, Finnell v. Cramet,
Inc., 289 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1961), courts have read the termination provisions mechanical-
ly, and in the last cited case, pension rights were considered as "expectancies." This atti-
tude is reflected in United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959), in
which the Supreme Court brushed aside an employee's claim for priority under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, admitting that pensions were part of the total wage package, but holding that
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difficulties in resolving the issue of qualification, it is uniformly held that em-
ployees who have qualified as to age and service are entitled to receive the
stipulated payments regardless of the expiration of the contract or contracts
under which such rights accrued.16 As with vacation and severance pay, the
courts speak in terms of "vesting" and "earning"; pension plans "encourage
career service and ... minimize labor turnover which is so costly to industry"
and "consideration flows to an employer as a result of such pension plans, in
the form of a more stable and more contented labor force."'1 In addition to
stressing the benefits which flow to the employer, courts state that "the em-
ployer may not defeat the employees' reasonable expectations of receiving the
promised reward."18
In upholding claims that monetary fringe benefits survive the termination of
the collective agreement, courts and arbitrators apparently make certain as-
sumptions about the intent and behavior of the parties to the collective contract.
Because vacation, severance, and pension benefits are of value, such benefits
are presumably substituted to some extent for wages during negotiations be-
tween the union and employer. This sacrifice by employees of wages for fringe
benefits leads adjudicators to treat fringe benefits as earned compensation."
That is, it is assumed that part of the employees' day to day services are given
in exchange for monetary fringe benefits. Since the magnitude of the fringe
benefit is usually correlated to the length of service,20 it is further assumed that
workers are induced to remain with an employer for a longer period than they
would in the absence of provisions for such benefits.21 The probable sacrifice
the "wages" requirement of the statute was not satisfied: "[W]e deal with a statute, not
business practice." 359 U.S. at 33.
16. New York City Omnibus Corp. v. Quill, 73 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y.
832, 78 N.E.2d 859 (1948). Cf. Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 38 L.R.R.M. 2367 (7th Cir,
1956) ; Vallejo v. American R.R. of Porto Rico, 188 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1951) ; Cantor v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960) ; Bird v. Connecticut
Power Co., 144 Corn. 456, 133 A.2d 894 (1957).
17. Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., supra note 21, at 520-21.
18. Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 463, 133 A.2d 894 (1957).
19. While wartime wage ceilings were in effect, fringe benefits became a popular alter-
native to wage increases. See AARON, THE EmPLOYMENT RELATION AND rH LANw 694
(1960). Subsequently, courts upheld the unionfs right to bargain over fringe benefits.
See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949). Union negotiators have pushed their demands for fringe benefits with con-
siderable success:
A typical manufacturing employer spent 45.4 cents an hour, or 2.2% of his gross an-
nual payroll for his production employees' fringe benefits in 1959. This is the finding
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its first comprehensive survey of fringe benefit
costs in manufacturing.
47 L.R.R.M. 42 (1961). Whatever the accuracy of these figures, there is no longer any
doubt that the total wage package includes some balance between fringe benefits and actual
wage increase.
20. See, e.g., 46 L.R.R.M. 26-29 (1961).
21. See, e.g., In re Wit-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); Cantor v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960) ; New York City Omnibus
Corp. v. Quill, 73 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 832, 78 N.E.2d 859 (1948) ; Amto ,
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of wages, performance of daily services, and continuous performance by em-
ployees-as the basis for the conclusion that monetary fringe benefits are earned
and survive termination suggest the application of either the concept of reliance
or the notion of substantial or complete performance of bargained-for services.
In making these assumptions about reliance and performance, courts and arbi-
trators have ignored the possibility that in any given case the fringe benefits
were not necessary to induce an employee to render his services or to remain
continuously at his job.
Another factor repeatedly stressed in the cases dealing with post-termination
rights is the element of managerial enrichment. Such emphasis suggests that
recovery after the expiration date is not strictly a contractual one based upon
the agreement itself, but, in traditional contract terms, is quasi-contractual. The
courts and arbitrators, however, have not distinguished between the two. Pro-
visions which scale fringe benefits to length of service presumably benefit the
employer by encouraging career service and reducing costly labor turnover."2
THE EIPLOYmENT RELATION AND THE LAW 788 (1960) ; Brissenden, Labor Mobility and
Employee Benefits, 6 LAD. L.J. 762 (1955).
22. GANDE, LABOR TuRNovER: CALCULATION AND Cosr (1960). This study details




3. Employment Agency Fees
4. Brochures
5. Prizes and awards to employees
6. Public Relations activities
II. Selection and Placement Costs
1. Letters of application
2. Application Blanks
3. Interviewing




8. Applicant's travel expenses
9. Security and credit investigation
10. Personnel Department overhead
III. On The Job Costs
1. Putting the man on the job
2. Company Badge
3. Safety Glasses
4. Indoctrination and training
5. Break in costs
IV. Cost of Separating Incumbent
1. Exit interviews
2. Severance pay
3. Social Security Tax Costs
4. Increased unemployment insurance costs
S. Intangible costs
The study also concludes that the relationship between mobility estimates and turnover is
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To the extent that continued service produces increased efficiency in particular
job operations and develops new industrial skills an employer is further bene-
fited by such provisions. Courts and arbitrators, in advancing the concept of
employer enrichment or receipt of bargained-for performance, have been will-
ing to accept the assumption behind enrichment without considering the possi-
bility that an employee's diminished productivity in later years may outweigh
the benefits previously conferred upon the employer and that particular fringe
benefits may have been unnecessary to induce an employee to render his ser-
vices.
Although monetary fringe benefits are often considered "earned" and
"accrued," they differ in several respects from accrued wages. While both
wages and fringe benefits may be earned only by rendering services for a speci-
fied period, the right to payment of fringe benefits is also conditioned upon the
occurrence or non-occurrence of specific events. Thus, severance pay and vaca-
tion pay, even though earned, are not due if the termination of the employment
relationship is the result of the employee's death, resignation, or discharge for
cause.23 Under some pension plans, retirement rights become worthless if the
employee dies before he reaches retirement age. Contingencies which defeat the
right to earned fringe benefits seem to be events which are related to the very
function of the particular fringe benefit. Thus, the severance benefit is not pay-
able if the employment relationship does not terminate. Moreover, these events
appear to be triggered by the employee; unilateral managerial action, such as
cessation of business or wrongful discharge, does not defeat the claims of em-
ployees who have met the required conditions.4
Zdanok v. Glidden
The reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in a recent decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-Zdanok v. Gliddcn-presents
the various viewpoints taken toward the survival of job security rights upon
the occurrence of termination and plant removal.25 Since 1949 the Glidden
as close as this Comment assumes; "Management regards labor turnover as costly and
wasteful.. . labor turnover ... [is] one specific phase of labor mobility." Id. at 7-8.
See also HIcKs, THE THEORY OF WAGES 70 (1957).
23. See, e.g., the provisions in Adams v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 37 L,R.R.M.
2691, 2692 (N.J. 1956) ; Campbell Soups, 21 Lab. Arb. 413 (1953) ; Cheney Bros., 23 Lab.
Arb. 395 (1954). Compare the provisions in Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537,
120 A.2d 442 (1956); Ackerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Minn. 271, 48 N.W.2d
338 (1951). See also Campbell Soup Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 214 (1956).
24. See, e.g., In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940):
If the employer had discharged the employee wrongfully after the latter had done
the work necessary to earn a vacation he could not be deprived of the benefits due
him .... It can make no difference whether the discharge was due, as here, to a
cessation of business by the employer, or was wrongful.
Id. at 432.
25. Zdanok v. Glidden. Co., 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 288 F.2d 99




Company and Local 852 of the Teamster's Union had negotiated two-year con-
tracts. The last agreement ran from December 1, 1955 to November 30, 1957,
and provided for layoff in reverse order of seniority, recall rights for a period
of three years following layoff for those employees who had accumulated five
years of seniority, and a non-contributory pension plan with early retirement
for those with high seniority. On May 16, 1957 the Elmhurst employees were
notified of impending discontinuance of operations; on September 16 the com-
pany gave written notice of its intention to terminate the agreement on the
expiration date, and began to cut back production for the purpose of removing
its machinery from the Elmhurst, New York plant to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
The work at the new location was substantially similar to that at the old and
required the use of many of the same machines. Five employees, each of whom
had accumulated more than five years' seniority and had been laid off prior to
the expiration date claimed that there was an implied condition that their in-
dividual recall rights would survive the termination of the collective bargaining
agreement. The Second Circuit, in reversing the district court, held that em-
ployees could enforce their contractual recall rights after termination of the
collective contract and after the employer had removed his operations to an-
other location.26 The court rested its holding on an analogy to retirement rights
of employees who qualified prior to expiration.
These rights to retired pay, though their realization will extend far into
the future, and though they arise solely and only out of the terms of the
union agreement with the defendant, have been treated as "vested rights"
... we suppose, because the employees had earned these rights by com-
pliance with the terms of the contract, and the fact that the contract was
not renewed, and that other workmen in the future might not have the
opportunity to earn similar rights, was irrelevant. . . the plaintiff em-
ployees had, by the same token, "earned" their valuable unemployment
insurance.. . their rights in it were vested and could not be unilaterally
anulled.27
Having established that recall rights survived termination, the court rejected
the Company's contention that recall rights did not follow the plant. The lan-
guage in the agreement referring to the Elmhurst address, the court believed,
merely served the purpose of identification rather than embodying any geo-
graphical limitation on the employees' recall rights.2
Chief judge Lumbard, in his dissenting opinion, cited a case upholding a
union's right to bargain away seniority rights in support of the conclusion that
26. 288 F.2d at 104.
27. Id. at 103.
28. Id. at 104. The provision reads:
Agreement between. Durkee Famous Foods Division of the Glidden Company, No.
23-Elmhurst, New York, and General Warehousemen's Union, Local 852 (of
Teamsters] .... December 1, 1955 to November 30, 1957 ... for and on behalf of
[the Company's] plant facilities located at Corona Avenue and 94th Street, Elm-
burst, Long Island, New York ....
185 F. Supp. at 448 n.27.
1962]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
recall rights, based on seniority, were not "vested" and thus did not survive
the termination of the agreement.29 He pointed to the fact that the contract con-
tained neither an express provision for post-termination recall rights,80 nor
provisions granting employees the right to "follow the work."81
The two major questions raised by Glidden are whether recall rights survive
termination of a collective contract and whether such rights survive plant re-
location. Because there is no available body of doctrine here, but that peculiar
adaptation of contractual principles used in vacation, pension, and severance
cases, the answer to these questions should depend upon the extent to which
the right to recall is similar to employee's rights to severance, vacation, or pen-
sion pay, or more specifically, similar in respect to those factors-sacrifice, ex-
penditure of effort by the employee, and enrichment of the employer-which
have led courts to conclude that a vacation, severance, or pension right is
earned.
Given the dearth of studies dealing with collective contract negotiations, it
cannot be determined with certainty that union representatives sacrifice wages
or monetary fringe benefits in return for job security rights.82 It has been sug-
gested, however, that there is some substitution of such rights for wages or
other fringe benefits.83 Since job security rights are of value to employees it is
likely that union representatives would be willing to sacrifice pecuniary benefits
of lesser value in return for such rights 34 and that an employer, aware of the
value of seniority rights to employees, would demand sacrifices in exchange
29. 288 F.2d at 105. The case cited was Elder v. New York Central R.R., 152 F.2d
361 (6th Cir. 1945).
30. 288 F.2d at 105.
31. Ibid. The district court had earlier dismissed the employees' contention on the
ground that the collective agreement gave the employees no right to follow the work, be-
fore or after termination. 185 F. Supp. at 441. Judge Palmieri stressed the absence in the
agreement of a commonly found provision granting transfer rights or multiplant seniority,
the reference in the agreement to the original location and to department and plant seniority,
and the absence of a history of removal rights upon past transfer of operations. Id. at
448-49.
32. The fact that monetary fringe benefits are normally reduced to a cash figure at tile
bargaining table is generally cited as proof of such sacrifice. Cf. authorities cited in note
19 supra.
33. "The discovery that workers and unions are importantly motivated by nonpecunlary
considerations. . ." is alluded to in, CHAMBERLaIN, CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 366 (1951).
Dunlop, Wage Policies of Trade Unions, 32 Am. Ecox. REV. 290 (Supp. 1942) states that:
[S]eniority... [is] not to be regarded as less essential to the total agreement than
the wage structure. The contract is made in view of all the conditions of the ex-
change. At times, bargaining over the total agreement will include some substitution
between these two groups [wage and non-pecuniary] of terms.
A growth in the seniority provision as the basis for job security parallels the increased
prevalence of fringe benefits. See Basic Patterns in Union Contracts, 47 L.R.R.M. 28, 39
(1961).
34. "It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that in some industries .. employees build
their lives upon, seniority preferences . . ." Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL.
L Rv. 151, 164 (1957).
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for granting them. Although empirical studies indicate that guarantees of job
security, along with other fringe benefits, tend to discourage worker mobility, 5
there is no direct evidence on the extent to which the right to be laid-off in
reverse order of seniority and recalled in order of seniority for a definite or
indefinite period 3 6 affects employee conduct.
In the case of monetary fringe benefits, courts and arbitrators assume reliance
without examining the amount of actual reliance on the particular provision
involved. There is no reason to believe that job security benefits less effectively
induce employees to render continuous services than do vacation or severance
benefits. To the contrary, since lay off and recall provisions are the essential
guarantees of job security, they are the features of the seniority system primarily
responsible for inducing service continuity. In some industries, at least, older
employees regard their seniority-that status which guarantees a job in a mar-
ket that becomes increasingly narrower with age-as more important than
higher wages or other benefits offered elsewhere. Clearly an employee would
be more likely to remain, or likely to remain longer, at a job which lays off in
reverse order of seniority than where order of lay off is at the employer's dis-
cretion. Moreover, continuous service would appear to be further induced by
a provision assuring recall based upon length of service and the period of such
preferential recall based upon seniority.3 The importance of the recall pro-
35. See, e.g., CouNciL EcoN. ADviSoRs Axx. RE. (1961); Brissenden, Labor Mobility
and Employee Benefits, 6 LAB. L.J. 762 (1955).
36. As to the prevalence of various types of recall arrangements:
Over three-fourths of agreements that specify rehiring procedures provide for re-
hiring in reverse order of layoff-the last laid off in the unit is the first rehired. In
addition 33% specifically give laid off employees preference over new employees
for vacancies that arise in other seniority units....
A maximum period of layoff, after which rehiring and seniority privileges are
lost, is specified by about 63% of agreements. This maximum layoff period is the
same length for all employees in about 38% of contracts, as opposed to the 25%
which vary the period of rehiring rights according to the employees' length of ser-
vice. Of those with the same period for all, over two-fifths set one year as the cutoff
date on rehiring rights. Another quarter specify two years. The remainder of these
provisions are divided about equally among limits of less tharn a year, a year and
one-half, and three years.
Where the period of rehiring rights is linked to the seniority record, practice is
divided. About two-thirds keep employees on rehiring and seniority lists for a period
equal to their service with the company, but set a maximum period nevertheless-
five years is the most frequent limit set, with one, two, and three years appearing
slightly less frequently. The others provide periods based upon different categories
of seniority; for example, employees with three months' service retai rehiring rights
for one year, those with one to five years' service for two years, with over five years'
service for three years.
4 BNA LABOR POLICY & PRACrCE 207, 601, 602 (1961).
37. If severance provisions encourage service continuity by providing a payment which
cushions unemployment, as suggested in Ackerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Minn.
271, 48 N.W.2d 338 (1951), and In re Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 156 (1959), then
such a recall provision, designed to remedy the same problem, should provide an analogous
inducement. Indeed, where the practice of the industry is to rehire frequently within a few
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vision is somewhat lessened where the preferential recall period is uniform for
all employees, regardless of length of service. The employees' strongest case
for reliance is under a lay off or recall provision which requires continuous
service during a specific earning period to qualify for job security benefits.
Where there is no specific earning period and employees are entitled to such
lay off and recall preference as their seniority status warrants, it is arguable
that job security rights do not survive, since there was no specific reciprocal
performance for the employees to render. Since order of lay off and recall are
based on seniority, such provisions nevertheless may have induced employees
to continue rendering services. The employees' case is weakest if there are no
recall rights.
The monetary fringe benefit cases also suggest that the value the employer
receives by virtue of continuous service, presumably induced by the fringe
benefit provisions, supports the employees' claim that rights are "earned" and
survive termination. At the termination of a collective agreement providing for
vacation, severance, or pension payments, it is assumed that the employer has
been unjustly enriched or has failed to render the contractual consideration in
return for the bargained-for performance. Where the order to lay off and recall
and the length of the recall period are based on seniority and there have been
no lay offs during the contract term, or laid-off employees have received less
than their full recall period, it may reasonably be presumed that the employer
has received benefits for which he is still indebted at the termination of the
agreement providing for job security benefits. Under such circumstances the
benefits received from employee services and continuity of employment are no
different from the managerial benefits obtained by virtue of employee reliance
on monetary fringe benefit provisions. Arguably, however, at the time of the
employees' claim to post-termination layoff or recall, the benefits the employer
received from the employees' reliance were offset by the costs of the job security
system as a whole. During the contract term the employer may have been
required to promote, layoff, and recall on the basis of seniority under circum-
stances in which he would have preferred to utilize other criteria. Restricting
management's right to promote, retain, and recall employees on the basis of their
ability may produce substantial managerial costs. On the other hand, there may
be managerial cost savings produced by an automatic system for effectuating
complex layoff procedures, such as the stability and good will engendered by
a predictable formula for managerial decisions significantly affecting the em-
ployees' welfare. When these factors are added to the monetary payments the
employer presumably avoided by agreeing to a seniority system, and the sav-
ings in turnover costs produced by continuity of employment, it may well be
that the seniority system on balance enhanced the employer's profits at the
expense of employees who relied on receiving job security rights.
Dissenting in Glidden, Chief Judge Lumbard argued that "Unions are...
years of layoff, and alternative employment opportunities are scarce, the recall right, with




able to protect themselves and their members at the bargaining table" and "it
is hardly 'irrational' ... for a court to leave the parties as they are if they have
never seen fit to provide otherwise." 38 This view presumes that silence speaks
for management; that if job security rights are to survive the termination date
the union must successfully bargain for a contractual provision to that effect
either at the time of the original negotiations or when the removal is imminent.
This is obviously not the view taken of the provisions providing vacation and
severance benefits, which are also based upon seniority status and which are
subject to the same termination clause in the collective agreement. Even aside
from these cases, the assumption that the termination clause cuts off job security
rights created by the agreement seems unsound. Collective bargaining agree-
ments generally contemplate indefinite renewals of the contractual relation-
ship; the termination date, therefore, is meant to serve the needs of the con-
tracting parties to reconsider and renegotiate the terms and conditions of future
management-union-employee relations in light of changing economic and social
conditions. 39 Contractual termination thus serves the same function as a "re-
opener" clause; the parties reconsider specific elements of their relationship
but rarely disturb its underlying roots. The termination clause can serve this
function without construing it to operate as an automatic limitation on job
security rights. Moreover, an express contractual clause making seniority bene-
fits (both monetary and security) nugatory after the termination date could
easily have been included. Its absence, and the ramifications such a clause
might have during the bargaining process, suggests that the language of the
agreement does not compel any conclusion in regard to the surviv-al of job
security rights. It is quite possible that at the time of negotiations neither party
raised or contemplated non-renewal of the agreement or plant removal prob-
lems or that removal was foreseen by the employer but not mentioned, or that
the possibility of removal was raised and dropped in favor of more pressing
problems. In these circumstances it would be erroneous to conclude that the
employer's superior bargaining power was responsible for the contractual
silence on the subject of job security rights after termination and plant re-
moval. Only where it is clear that the parties consciously explored and deliber-
ately omitted provisions covering job security rights in the event of plant re-
moval should the contention that silence speaks for management prevail.40 In
38. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99, 105 (1961).
39. The heart of the collective agreement ... is the process for continuous joint con-
sideration and the adjustment of plant problems. And it is this feature which in-
dicates the great difference between, the collective labor agreement and commercial
contracts generally. The latter are concerned primarily with "end results," the for-
mer with continuous process.
CHAmBERLAiN, CoLLEcTiVE BARGAINING (1951).
40. This standard was suggested in NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F2d 6S0 (2d Cir.
1952), enforcing 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), in the context of Board determination of sub-
jects bargainable during the term of the agreement. Although the decision does not indicate
how vigorously a matter must have been discussed before it may be deemed to have been
deliberately excluded from the agreement, it is clear that the Board is authorized to look
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the absence of such evidence, however, either disposition of the issue places an
affirmative gloss upon the existing contract terms.
In the absence of any substantial evidence of either party's intent, arguably
a rule of law placing the burden of including an express provision determining
survival on either party is superior to a complex inquiry into the extent of
sacrifice, reliance, and enrichment. But the difficulty with such a rule in the
plant removal situation lies in the potentially disruptive effect it would have
upon the collective bargaining process. For imposing an affirmative duty upon
either party to include an explicit provision disposing of seniority rights in case
of plant removal would require the union and management to settle a thorny
issue at a time when removal is merely hypothetical. Since in most cases the
problems presented by removal would never arise, requiring that the parties
bargain over this contingency would thus add an unnecessary issue to an al-
ready complex agenda upon which management and the union must reach an
agreement.
Judge Lumbard's statement that unions are "fully of age" and no longer
need judicial protection also seems to be an allusion to a policy of judicial non-
interference with the balance of power in collective bargaining. Where a dispute
arises that is not settled by the collective agreement, courts, rather than decide
the issue according to their own dictates of fairness, will "remand" the issue to
the parties for a determination. The NLRA supports this process by requiring
that the parties bargain in good faith 41 over all disputes that are not settled by
the collective agreement.4 2 But this solution would, in effect, decide the issue
for the employer, since the distribution of bargaining power has radically
shifted on the eve of removal. Thus, any protection afforded to employees
seeking to enforce their seniority rights by the requirement that the employer
bargain in good faith before relocating is illusory. Shortly before removal, in
the absence of an express or implied no-strike clause, a union may attempt to
enforce its demands by striking. The employer need bear the economic con-
sequences of a strike, however, only until he has bargained with the union to a
"good-faith impasse." 43 After reaching such an impasse, he is statutorily free
to parol evidence explaining the course of the negotiations. The suggestion that past
"discussion" might support the employer's contention, that the union had bargained away
seniority rights is not without drawbacks. The difficulty of ascertaining what actually
transpired during past negotiations suggests perhaps that a more rigorous standard should
be applied. A "bright line" test would create less problems of administration, for if the
employer has truly won the concession, requiring him to obtain the insertion of a contractual
provision spelling out this fact should create no hardship, so long as this rule is administered
prospectively.
41. LMRA, §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), 158(b) (3)
(1958). See also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); J. I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 134 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1943).
42. See NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), enforcing 94 N.LR.B.
1214 (1951). But see Local 9735, UMW v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
43. After impasse, the employer may take unilateral action. without committing an si-
fair labor practice, Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950),
provided that such action does not amount to bad faith "disparagement" of the collective
bargaining process, NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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to remove his operations without granting any of the union's requests.4 Fur-
thermore, the presence of a no-strike clause effectively prevents the union from
striking unless the strike is in response to an unfair labor practice.
Comparison of removal with contingencies which do not nullify monetary
fringe benefits based on seniority supports the conclusion that job security
rights survive the removal of a plant to a new location. Since removal seems
far less foreseeable than a failure to negotiate a new collective agreement or a
willful discharge after termination, contingencies which have been held not to
defeat the right to vacation or severance pay, the case for survival of job secu-
rity benefits after removal in fact seems stronger. At any rate, earned sever-
ance and vacation pay can be destroyed only by an event initiated by an
employee, such as his discharge for cause, resignation, or death. Since plant
removal is at the employer's initiative, it would seem that job security rights
as well as monetary fringe benefits remain intact. The holdings that the jobs
of employees with seniority may not be destroyed by arbitrary discharge or by
subcontracting or transferring jobs to non-bargaining unit employees also mili-
tate in favor of the employees' contention that their jobs survive removal.
Thus, an analysis of the rationale behind the holdings that the right to mone-
tary fringe benefits is not destroyed by termination of the collective contract
and an examination of the contingencies which defeat claims to monetary fringe
benefits suggest that job security rights should survive both the termination of
an agreement and the removal of a plant. These guidelines for deciding whether
seniority rights survive termination of the collective agreement, nevertheless,
should be regarded as highly tentative. Until studies are undertaken to deter-
mine the role played by various seniority provisions at the bargaining table and
in the economic calculations and welfare of the employer and employees, de-
cisions must be based on reasonable, albeit somewhat speculative, inferences.
To the extent that the approach of courts and arbitrators in dealing with rights
to vacation, severance, and pension pay is sound, however, the conclusion that
job security rights are unaffected by the termination of the collective agree-
ment seems warranted.
The Counter--Arguments
In light of the paucity of critical analysis of the issues presented by the
Glidden case, it seems fruitful to evaluate the soundness of this conclusion by
considering the arguments supporting a contrary one; the arguments opposing
the reasoning of the court in Glidden and, in general, rejecting the treatment
of job security rights as earned, have recently been elaborated in one of the
44. Along with the wide scope of legitimate "good faith" unilateral action which is
available to the employer who has bargained to an impasse, note the language of § 8(d),
defining "good faith":
[B]ut such obligation, does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession.
LMRA, § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
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few articles dealing with the issue.45 Professor Aaron contends that "seniority
rights are readily distinguishable from vacation pay benefits, with which they
are sometimes compared, because the latter are easily convertible into cash and
increasingly have come to be regarded as deferred compensation for services
already performed." 4 This reasoning appears fallacious, for it is difficult to
understand why a managerial obligation of value to employees may not be
specifically enforced merely because it has no easily ascertainable monetary
equivalent. Recall rights clearly have some value. Where an employer is con-
tractually required to transfer employees to a new plant after removal, the
union, in negotiating with the employer before removal, frequently trades some
or all transfer rights for severance pay and thus converts job security rights
into rights having a definite pecuniary value.47 The argument that vacation pay
is different from seniority benefits because the former have come to be regarded
as deferred compensation begs the question as to the nature of the latter. To
determine whether seniority rights are deferred compensation-i.e., earned or
accrued-one must examine the factors-sacrifice, reliance, and enrichment-
which warrant treating other fringe benefits as earned. Upon finding that such
elements are present, it seems appropriate to treat seniority rights as earned
and due after termination of the agreement.
In distinguishing severance pay from job security rights, Professor Aaron
relies upon a case holding that, although severance benefits could not be earned
after termination of the agreement, benefits which had been earned during the
contract period were due after termination. 4 s In other words, the measuring
rod for determining the amount of the disputed right did not extend beyond the
termination of the agreement; the right already earned, however, was not
destroyed by such termination. The conclusion that job security may be an
earned right is consistent with the above holding-it is here suggested only
that seniority rights earned and unpaid during the contract term are due after
termination, not that employees may earn new seniority rights under the ex-
pired agreement.
Professor Aaron's other attempts to distinguish seniority rights from other
fringe benefits similarly seem conclusory or erroneous. For example, it is
argued that "seniority is a system of beneficial employment preferences; it is
absolutely dependent upon the existence of an employment relationship .... If
the employer goes out of business, the employee with the most seniority is no
better off than the one with the least, and neither is entitled by his seniority to
a money indemnity for the loss of his job."49 This view ignores the fact that
job security is a relative right, which, by definition, assumes the availability of
45. Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniorily Rights,
75 HAuv. L. REv. 1532 (1962).
46. Id. at 1536-37.
47. See Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 3026 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
48. Aaron, supra note 45, at 1537. The case is Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J.
537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956).
49, Id. at 1540.
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at least some jobs. In fact, the only function of job security is to assure a
worker of the order in which he will be laid off or recalled when the number of
available jobs decreases or increases. Thus, because a right to job preference
becomes valueless when an employer goes out of business tells us nothing as to
the value or nature of that right where an employer has jobs available. While
seniority rights are obviously dependent upon the existence of the employment
relationship, they also place limitations upon the employer's power to sever
that relationship. It has often been held that seniority rights protect employees
from arbitrary discharge. Seniority rights also prevent an employer from trans-
ferring or subcontracting work to employees outside the bargaining unit and
successfully asserting that employees who lost their jobs were on a "permanent
layoff."50 Thus, though seniority rights may depend on the employment re-
lationship, they also preserve that relationship by prohibiting an employer from
removing available jobs from bargaining unit employees who give no cause to
be discharged.
Another argument advanced to support the contention that seniority rights
expire with the collective bargaining agreement is that while the rights to other
fringe benefits may be deemed "property" rights,
An employee has no power of disposition over his bundle of beneficial
employment preferences except the power to relinquish them; he may not
sell or assign them, give them to any person he chooses, or negotiate in-
dividually with his employer for changes advantageous to himself. His
rights are created and nourished by the collective agreement; when it
lapses or is changed, they expire or are changed accordingly.51
Seniority rights may not be sold, assigned, or bequeathed because they are
rights to enter into a personal relationship; the employer has promised to
accept continued service, if appropriate jobs are available, from particular em-
ployees who have accumulated seniority, not from their donees, assignees, or
vendees. Since the non-alienability of seniority rights does not inhibit a court
from enforcing such rights during the term of the agreement, there is no reason
why the termination of the agreement should allow non-transferability to pre-
50. The argument has frequently been made that the very existence of a seniority
roster implies a restriction upon employer power to discharge arbitrarily. See Higgins
Industries, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. 439 (1955) ; Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 747 (1949).
But see Okenite Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 756 (1954). Although the contention .was rejected in
Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 39 L.RR.M. 2555 (Utah 1957), it should be noted
that there the seniority roster was alterable within the discretion of the employer, and the
layoff order was similarly qualified by "reasonableness." It is submitted that Held is wrong
in principle to the extent that it assumes that arbitrary managerial action can coexist with
a thoroughgoing seniority system. Seniority has been held to restrict the employer's free-
dom to reduce the work week; Wesley v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 44 L.RR.M. 2019 (Ohio
1959). Moreover, seniority is a restriction upon the employer's freedom to subcontract,
Local 391, U.A.W. v. Webster Electric Co., 48 L.R.RF M. 2111 (E.D. Wis. 1961) ; DeAtley
Paving & Crushing Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 496 (1961) ; Mead Paper Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 342
(1961) ; U.S. Potash Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 442 (1961).
51. Aaron, supra note 45, at 1540.
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dlude their enforcement. In short, the enforceability of a recall right does not
depend on its meeting the definition of a "property right"; designating it a
"contract right" will warrant granting relief. It is further argued that since an
employee or the union cannot trade or bargain job security rights after termi-
nation of the agreement, such rights necessarily expire when the agreement
lapses.52 Where a union is the designated representative of employees, an em-
ployee may not negotiate individually with his employer for changes advan-
tageous to himself. But this limitation, arising out of the nature of collective
representation, is no more relevant to the question of post-termination survival
of seniority than the nonalienability factors discussed above. Furthermore,
whether an individual, or union, at the termination of the agreement can trade
job security rights for monetary rights depends on whether the former are
entitled to judicial protection; to assert that the union and employee cannot
bargain about seniority rights is merely to conclude that such rights are not
earned, not to establish the validity of such proposition.
A similar objection is applicable to the statement that seniority rights are
created by the collective agreement and expire with the agreement.53 "[T]he
rule has always been ... that... 'collective bargaining agreements do not...
extend [seniority] rights ... beyond [the] life [of a contract], when it has
been terminated in accordance with its provisions.' ,,4 If this statement is to
be more than a mere assertion, it must imply that seniority rights do not sur-
vive the agreement because they are created by the agreement. That such
proposition is erroneous becomes immediately apparent upon observing that
other fringe benefits survive the termination of the collective agreement which
created them. The principal case cited for this proposition is the only reported
decision holding that a contractual recall period is cut off by termination of
the agreement and is distinguishable from Glidden because the union ultimate-
ly ratified the abrogation of job security rights; the other cases cited for this
proposition uphold the right of a union to modify seniority rights. The fact
that a union may bargain away seniority rights does not support the con-
tention that such rights are not earned or vested. The union is the representa-
tive of the employees, the employer is their opponent at the bargaining table.
Thus the policies behind judicial refusal to interfere with a union's ability to
modify or eliminate employee rights are not relevant to the employer's asser-
tion that he may abrogate such rights. Union representatives have a statutory
duty to further the interests of all the members of the bargaining unit ;5 in the
process of advancing the welfare of the majority, the interests of particular
employees must occasionally be compromised.5 Unless minority employees
have been blatantly denied fair representation, or have been discriminated
52. Ibid.
53. Id. at 1542.
54. Ibid.
55. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
56. The philosophy of majority rule is clearly expressed in Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls,
331 U.S. 40, 49 (1947). See also Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) and
cases cited in notes 57 and 58 infra.
[Vol. 72:'162
JOB SECURITY
against for invidious reasons,57 courts are extremely reluctant to scrutinize a
union's bargaining policies,58 for it is believed that excessive judicial activism
in this area would inhibit the flexible union leadership needed to deal with
changing employee needs.
Remedies
The principal difficulty in fashioning an appropriate remedy lies in establish-
ing guidelines that will enable the employee to receive the benefit of recall
rights at the new plant without unduly hampering the operations of the em-
ployer or the flexibility of union representatives. Where employees are found
to have earned the right to be recalled and are not represented by a union at
the new plant, a court should assure that the employer does not take action
which would render the recall right illusory.5 9 In order for recall rights to be
meaningful, there must be some limitations on the employer's power to affect
the welfare of transferred employees. Such employees should be entitled to com-
parable job positions at the new plant to the extent that they are availablecO
57. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical Lodge v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949); Elder v. N.Y. Central R.R., 152 F2d 361 (6th Cir.
1945); Belanger v. Local Division 1128, 256 Wis. 479, 41 N.W2d 607 (1950); Kern v.
Duquesne Brewing Co., 44 L.R.R.M. 2670 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
58. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v.
Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Cf. NLRB v. LA.M., 279 F.2d 761 (9th
Cir. 1960); Pellicer v. Brotherhood of Ry. & SS. Clerks, 118 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Fla.
1953) ; Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 45 L.R.R.M. 2137 (Wis. 1959) ; Gleason v. Thomas,
186 S.E. 304 (W. Va. 1936) ; Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 193 Ky. 477, 248 S.W.
1042 (1923).
59. The problem of integration of employees whose employment was interrupted by
military service is handled by the Selective Service Act of 1948, § 9, 62 Stat. 614 (1948),
50 U.S.C. APP. § 459 (1958), and especially § 459(c) (1) which gives protection against
discharge without cause for one year after reinstatement. This is designed to aid those
returning to non-unionized jobs. Those returning to unionized work are guaranteed reten-
tion of seniority which would have accrued had they remained in the unit for the same
period. The basic right to the job was demonstrated in Dame v. C. A. Batsonr Co., 157 F.
Supp. 862 (D. Mass. 1958), wihere a common laborer was given damages for the employer's
failure to make work available to him. The court conceded that the employer may normally
select his employees daily where there is no seniority system, but held that the veteran w-as
entitled to some "preference." The employer cannot escape the statutory obligation by sale
of the business; Rix v. Turnbull-Novak, Inc., 245 F2d 809 (8th Cir. 1957). Although
concededly there is statutory authority in these cases for protection, of the job rights of
transferred employees against employer action directed at rendering the job right illusory,
the suggestion is that these cases provide some experience for solving the problems raised
by recall rights at a new plant. The statute recognizes the equity of those who served dur-
ing the war; the proposed rule of construction recognizes the equity of those who have
"earned" rights by steady continuation in service.
60. By hypothesis, the new plant replaces the old, so that there is substantial similarity
of operations rendering the determination of what is "comparable" less difficult. The return-
ing veteran steps upon an "escalator" upon, induction, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946). Wher he returns, he receives a job comparable to that
which he would have had if he had remained in the unit, McKinney v. Missouri-K-T R.R.,
357 U.S. 265 (1958) ; McNichols v. Southern Ry. Co., 194 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Ky. 1951).
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Since the right to a job does not necessarily embody the right to any specific
wage rate, their wages need not be equal to those they were receiving at the old
plant. The employer, however, should not be permitted to nullify the recall
right by paying transferred employees lower wages than those received by
other employees doing comparable work or by employees whose job positions
commanded relatively lower wages at the original plant. Furthermore, an em-
ployer should not be free to discharge arbitrarily his transferred employees,
nor to revise the seniority roster in such manner as to impair the preferential
status for layoff and recall of transferred employees. But there is no reason to
require the employer to permit transferred employees to continue earning sever-
ance and vacation pay or layoff and recall benefits within the terms of the ex-
pired agreement, although rights which have been earned under that agreement
must be recognized. This managerial duty should protect the employee only to
the extent that he would have been protected under the old contract at the
former plant; the employer should still be free to discharge for valid cause, to
lay off where economic necessity so dictates, and to modify, alter, or abolish
specific job operations and thereby sever employment where good faith busi-
ness considerations so require.
A transferred employee's job security rights should endure for the full dura-
tion of the recall period to guarantee the employee the kind of job security
envisaged by the old agreement. Where there is a fixed recall period, it should
begin tolling at the contract termination date or the layoff date, whichever is
earlier. Thus, a transferred employee laid off in good faith at the new site
should retain the right to successive recall and concomitant job security until
the period specified in the old agreement expires. Where there is no fixed recall
period, the ordinary understanding of the parties is that employees have received
something more than a fixed recall period, for a fixed recall period is ordinarily
inserted at management's behest as a limitation of the employee's recall rights.01
Yet the intention could not have been to grant recall rights in perpetuity.
Thus, courts must devise some appropriate means of limiting the duration of
the indefinite recall right, while preserving vitality commensurate with the
original purpose. Since most fixed recall periods are shorter than state statutes
of limitations for contract actions, the period provided by such statutes, again
tolling from the earlier of the layoff or contract termination date, seems appro-
priate.6 2 To protect the employer from unconscionably long-delayed assertions
of the recall right, during which period the employer would be likely to fill the
61. In order to maintain a more efficient working force, management frequently urges
the inclusion in the collective agreement of a "cut-off" provision which will serve to termi-
nate the seniority rights of employees who have been laid off for continuous periods of one
year or more. Mitchem, Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 21 Rocity
MT. L. REv. 156, 183 (1949).
62. On length of recall periods, see note 61 mpra. The following statutes of limitation
selected at random suggest that the average statutory period is longer than the average
bargained recall period: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8106, 8120 (1953) (three years) ; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 57, § 1 (1939) (three years) ; CAL. CODE CIVIL PRoc. §§ 337-38 (four
years) ; ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 21 (1960) (six years).
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jobs of potential transferees, a dilatory former employee should lose his right
of recall. However, he should be entitled to a job if an opening appears within
the suggested period.
63
The same considerations that required a distinction between the employer's
and the union's power to divest employees of earned seniority rights suggest
that the above limitations upon management should not apply to a union certi-
fied as bargaining representative at the new plant. Courts have been extremely
reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the union negotiators when
choice of seniority rosters and placement of competing employee groups with-
in them are at issue.
DAVID R LEvET4I
63. The period is used as an outer limit in actions brought under the Selective Service
Act; Walsh v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 90 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. IlL 1949). Cf. Cum-
mings v. Hubbell, 7 F.R-D. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1947). The only precedent for this problem is
a case holding that indefinite recall rights are limited to the term of the agreement. System
Federation 59 v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 119 F2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941). If previous analysis
demonstrating the intended effectiveness of such indefinite periods is sound, the use of the
limitations period seems preferable to the disposition in System Fcderation.
Should the use of the contractual recall period and statutes of limitation prove to be a
cumbersome method of limiting duration of the substantive right to recall and job protec-
tion, a court might, on analogy to statutorily protected seniority, apply a flat one-year
period from the date of removal. Since removal has ramifications akin to decertification,
and protection must only be afforded to employees who are unrepresented by a new union,
the Taft-Hartley one-year period insulating certification elections provides a further ex-
ample for the establishment of a one-year period.
64. This suggestion is analogous to a device which was used where the veteran was
tardy in asserting his rights: recovery against the employer was limited to prospective
benefits only; Anglin v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 77 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. XV. Va. 1948)
(action brought 18 months after discharge from service); Thompson v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. Co., 76 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. NV. Va. 1948) (16 months). If the delay is too long, the
equitable doctrine of laches is available even when the relevant period has not expired.
Cases under the Selective Service Act have applied this principle: Lacek v. Peoples Laun-
dry Co., 94 F. Supp. 399 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (four years) ; Marque v. Stem, 88 F. Supp. 306
(M.D. Pa. 1950) (two years); Polansky v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 78 F. Supp. 74 (D.
N.J. 1948) (13 months).
tLL.B. 1962, Yale Law School.
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